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Abstract: Do industries shed jobs when they adopt new labor-saving technologies? 
Sometimes productivity-enhancing technology increases industry employment instead. In 
manufacturing, jobs grew along with productivity for a century or more; only later did 
productivity gains bring declining employment. What changed? Markets became saturated. 
While the literature on structural change provides reasons for the decline in the 
manufacturing share of employment, few papers can explain both the rise and subsequent 
fall. Using two centuries of data, a simple model of demand accurately explains the rise and 
fall of employment in the US textile, steel, and automotive industries. The model helps 
explain why the Industrial Revolution was highly disruptive despite low productivity growth 
and why information technologies appear to have positive effects on employment today.  
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When an industry automates its production does its employment decline? There is 
widespread concern today that many jobs will be lost to new computer technologies. One 
recent paper concluded that new information technologies will put “a substantial share of 
employment, across a wide range of occupations, at risk in the near future” (Frey and 
Osborne 2013).  
The example of manufacturing decline provides good reason to be concerned about 
technology and job losses. In 1958, the US broadwoven textile industry employed over 300 
thousand production workers and the primary steel industry employed over 500 thousand. 
By 2011, broadwoven textiles employed only 16 thousand and steel employed only 100 
thousand production workers.1 Some of these losses can be attributed to trade, especially 
since the mid-1990s. However, overall since the 1950s in developed economies, most of the 
decline in manufacturing employment appears to come from technology and changing 
demand (Rowthorn and Ramaswamy 1999). Of course, jobs lost in one industry may be 
replaced with new jobs in another, but many fear that deindustrialization has heightened 
economic inequality in the US or caused unemployment in Europe and caused political 
instability in both. “Premature deindustrialization” has also become a concern in developing 
nations (Rodrik 2016). 
Yet technical change does not always lead to declining employment in the affected 
industry. Figure 1 shows how textiles, steel, and automotive manufacturing all enjoyed 
strong employment growth during many decades that also experienced very rapid 
productivity growth. This “inverted U” pattern appears to be quite general for 
                                               
1 These figures are for the broadwoven fabrics industry using cotton and manmade fibers, SIC 2211 and 2221, 
and the steel works, blast furnaces, and rolling mills industry, SIC 3312. 
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manufacturing industries across many industries in the developed world and also in 
developing nations (Buera and Kaboski 2009, Rodrik 2016). 
 
Figure 1. Production Employment in Three Industries 
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This pattern presents an important puzzle. Why is automation associated with 
growing employment in some industries at some times, while at other times and in other 
industries jobs are lost? What determines whether technical change tends to increase 
employment in an industry or decrease it? The answer would seem to be important for 
understanding what affects the pace of deindustrialization in both the developed and 
developing worlds and for anticipating the impact of new technologies. 
This paper uses a novel model of industry demand and century-long time series data 
on the US cotton textile, steel, and automotive manufacturing industries to explore what 
determines whether technology will increase or decrease employment. While a substantial 
literature has looked at structural change at the level of the manufacturing sector as a whole, 
the data for these individual industries allows a tighter identification of the interaction 
between technology, demand, prices, and income.2 I argue that the most widely accepted 
explanations for deindustrialization are inconsistent with the entire observed historical 
pattern. Few models can account for the initial rise in employment. In addition, most models 
are based either on productivity differentials between sectors or differential income 
elasticities of demand, but not both.3 Using nonparametric tests, I show that both factors are 
needed to explain industry demand patterns over long time scales. 
To explain the inverted U pattern, I present a simple model where demand responds 
to both factors. This model is related to the notion of hierarchical preferences (Matsuyama 
2002) but draws even more directly on the original notion of a demand curve (Dupuit 1844). 
Demand becomes satiated as productivity drives down prices over long periods of time. 
During the early years, pent up consumer needs meant that price declines generated a 
                                               
2 Papers empirically analyzing the sector shifts include Dennis and Iscan (2009), Buera and Kaboski (2009), 
Kollmeyer (2009), Nickell, Redding, and Swaffield (2008), and Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1999). 
3 An exception is Boppart (2014). 
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strongly elastic response; product demand grew faster than the decline in labor required per 
unit of output so that employment increased. Later, demand became satiated so that further 
price declines generated only modest increases in demand that failed to offset the labor-
saving effect of automation.4 I show that this pattern of changing demand elasticity arises 
under rather general conditions. Applying the model to the actual data for textiles, steel and 
motor vehicles, it predicts the rise and fall of employment in these industries with reasonable 
accuracy: the solid line in Figure 1 shows those predictions. 
This analysis has implications for understanding both the past and the future impact 
of technology. Rapid demand growth may be key to understanding why the Industrial 
Revolution was so transformative despite exhibiting relatively slow productivity growth, 
including major increases in industrial employment, a swift transition from workshops to 
larger factories that exploited economies of scale, and the pace at which national markets 
emerged. And the central role of product demand in mediating the impact of technology on 
employment means that many industries today may have elastic, job-increasing responses to 
new information technologies. 
Structural change 
The literature on structural change has focused on the employment of the entire 
manufacturing sector, not on individual industries, as is the focus here. It is well-established 
that the manufacturing share of a nation’s employment tends to trace an inverted-U, rising 
and later falling. The rise and fall of individual industries seen in Figure 1 must necessarily 
contribute to the rise and fall of the sector share. Nevertheless, these are two distinct, but 
related problems. Consequently, models of sectoral change do not necessarily apply to 
                                               
4 Diebolt (1997) notes that Emil Lederer explored this relationship between the elasticity of demand and 
employment in the 1920s and 1930s. 
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individual industries and vice versa. For example, employment in the automotive industry 
appears to have risen rapidly nearly fifty years after the steel industry and nearly a century 
after the cotton textile industry. This timing seems to result from industry-specific 
innovations, namely the power-loom in 1814, US adoption of the Bessemer steelmaking 
process after 1865, and Henry Ford’s assembly line in 1913. While general macroeconomic 
factors such as rising income levels surely influenced the rise of consumption of these three 
commodities, specific productivity increases also seem to have played a role. 
The model developed here takes into account both industry-specific productivity 
growth and also economy-wide income growth. Most of the structural change literature 
accounts for the relative employment decline in manufacturing either as the result of 1) 
different rates of productivity growth, or, 2) from different effects of income growth on 
demand, but not both.5  
Baumol (1967) showed that the greater rate of technical change in manufacturing 
industries relative to services leads to a declining share of manufacturing employment under 
some conditions (see also Lawrence and Edwards 2013, Ngai and Pissarides 2007, 
Matsuyama 2009). But differences in productivity growth rates do not seem to explain the 
initial rise in employment. For example, during the 19th century, the share of employment in 
agriculture fell while employment in manufacturing industries such as textiles and steel 
soared both in absolute and relative terms. But labor productivity in these manufacturing 
industries grew faster than labor productivity in agricultural. Parker and Klein (1966) find 
that labor productivity in corn, oats, and wheat grew 2.4%, 2.3%, and 2.6% per annum from 
                                               
5 An important exception is Boppart (2014). However, Boppart’s model uses fixed price and income elasticities 
of demand and cannot account for the rise and later fall of manufacturing employment. Acemoglu and 
Guerrieri (2008) also propose an explanation based on differences in capital deepening. 
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1840-60 to 1900-10. In contrast, labor productivity in cotton textiles grew 3.0% per year 
from 1820 to 1900 and labor productivity in steel grew 3.0% from 1860 to 1900.6 
Nevertheless, employment in cotton textiles and in primary iron and steel manufacturing 
grew rapidly then. While differential rates of productivity growth are likely important for 
understanding relative industry employment growth, they do not seem to provide a complete 
explanation. 
The growth of manufacturing relative to agriculture surely involves some general 
equilibrium considerations, perhaps involving surplus labor in the agricultural sector (Lewis 
1954). But at the industry level, rapid labor productivity growth along with job growth must 
mean a rapid growth in the equilibrium level of demand—the amount consumed must 
increase sufficiently to offset the labor-saving effect of technology. For example, although 
labor productivity in cotton textiles increased nearly 30-fold during the nineteenth century, 
consumption of cotton cloth increased 100-fold. The inverted U thus seems to involve an 
interaction between productivity growth and demand. 
A long-standing literature sees sectoral shifts arising from differences in the income 
elasticity of demand. Clark (1940), building on earlier statistical findings by Engel (1857) and 
others, argued that necessities such as food, clothing, and housing have income elasticities 
that are less than one (see also Boppart 2014, Comin, Lashkari, and Mestieri 2015, 
Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie 2001 and Matsuyama 1992 for more general treatments of 
nonhomothetic preferences). The notion behind “Engel’s Law” is that demand for 
necessities becomes satiated as consumers can afford more, so that wealthier consumers 
spend a smaller share of their budgets on necessities. Similarly, this tendency is seen playing 
out dynamically. As nations develop and their incomes grow, the relative demand for 
                                               
6 My estimates, data described below. 
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agricultural and manufactured goods falls and, with labor productivity growth, relative 
employment in these sectors falls even faster.  
This explanation is also incomplete, however. While a low income elasticity of 
demand might explain late 20th century deindustrialization, it does not easily explain the 
rising demand for some of the same goods during the nineteenth century. By this account, 
cotton textiles are a necessity with an income elasticity of demand less than one. Yet during 
the 19th century, the demand for cotton cloth grew dramatically as incomes rose. That is, 
cotton cloth must have been a “luxury” good then. Nothing in the theory explains why the 
supposedly innate characteristics of preferences for cloth changed.7  
There is another reason why income-based explanations may be incomplete: the data 
suggest that productivity growth was often far more consequential for consumers than 
income growth. From 1810 to 2011, real GDP per capita rose 30-fold, but output per hour 
in cotton textiles rose over 800-fold and prices relative to wages correspondingly fell by 
three orders of magnitude. Similarly, from 1860 to 2011, real GDP per capita rose 17-fold, 
but output per hour in steel production rose over 100 times and relative prices fell by a 
similar proportion. Much of the literature on structural change has focused on the income 
elasticity of demand, often ignoring price changes. Yet these magnitudes suggest that low 
prices might substantially contribute to any satiation of demand. Below I conduct non-
parametric tests on the contribution of income and productivity to demand growth. I find 
that productivity growth contributes significantly to demand growth in all specifications, but 
income growth does not. The model developed below includes both income and price 
effects on demand, allowing both to have changing elasticities over time. 
                                               
7 Banks et al. (1997) find that some commodities show a fall in income elasticity when examined in cross-
sectional data. This might reflect differences in preferences across social classes, for example, in alcohol 
consumption. However, this does not seem to be a likely explanation of the very large changes in elasticities I 
find below nor of long secular changes over very large changes in income. 
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The inverted U pattern in industry employment can, in fact, be explained by 
changing price elasticities of demand. If we assume that rapid productivity growth generated 
rapid price declines in competitive product markets, then these price declines would be a 
major source of demand growth. If product demand grows fast enough, then demand for 
labor will increase despite the reduction in the labor required per unit of output. If demand 
is highly elastic during the early years, then income growth and productivity-induced price 
declines could raise equilibrium product demand sufficiently to offset the labor-saving 
effects of automation. Later, if demand becomes relatively inelastic, then income growth and 
price declines would only generate modest increases in demand, insufficient to raise net 
employment. Automation and income growth would boost industry employment at first, but 
lead to falling industry employment later.  
Matsuyama (2002) introduced a model where the income elasticity of demand for 
goods falls as incomes grow (see also Foellmi and Zweimueller 2008). In this model, 
consumers have hierarchical preferences for different products, each consumer buys one 
unit of each product, and consumers have heterogeneous incomes. As income levels grow, 
consumers progressively buy new products further down the hierarchy. Demand for 
manufactured goods (higher in the hierarchy of products) could become satiated before 
demand for services (lower in the hierarchy), leading to a U-shape in the relative 
employment in the manufacturing sector.  
Formally, Matsuyama’s model explains the rise and fall of the entire manufacturing 
sector as demand shifts from one product to another, but the model does not provide a 
realistic explanation of the rise and fall of employment in individual industries. Nevertheless, 
the notion of hierarchical preferences is useful and can be applied to a hierarchy of uses for 
an individual product. 
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Indeed, such a hierarchy is implicit in the original notion of the demand curve. 
Dupuit (1844) recognized that consumers placed different values on goods used for different 
purposes. A decrease in the price of stone would benefit the existing users of stone, but 
consumers would also buy stone at the lower price for new uses such as replacing brick or 
wood in construction or for paving roads. In this way, Dupuit showed how the distribution 
of uses at different values gives rise to what we now call a demand curve, allowing for a 
calculation of consumer surplus.  
This paper proposes a parsimonious explanation for the rise and fall of industry 
employment based on a simple model where consumer preferences follow such a 
distribution function. The basic intuition is that when most consumers are priced out of the 
market (the upper tail of the distribution), demand elasticity and income elasticity will tend to 
be high for many common distribution functions. When, thanks to technical change and 
income growth, price falls (income rises) to the point where most consumer needs are met 
(the lower tail), then the price and income elasticities of demand will be small. The price and 
income elasticities of demand thus change as technology brings lower prices to the affected 
industries and higher income to consumers generally.  
I fit the model to actual demand data for the three industries with a lognormal 
specification that allows for changes in both the price elasticity of demand and the income 
elasticity of demand. The model estimates per capita demand accurately using only a single 
independent variable: labor productivity. I use the demand estimates to make the predictions 
of the actual rise and fall of employment in the textile, steel, and automotive industries 
shown in Figure 1.  
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Model 
Simple model of the Inverted U 
Consider production and consumption of two goods, cloth, quantity y, and a general 
composite good, quantity x, in autarky. The model will focus on the impact of technology on 
employment in the textile industry under the assumption that the output and employment in 
the textile industry are only a small part of the total economy. The model aims to sketch out 
how industry-specific productivity growth and general income growth can affect demand, 
including conditions where these trends give rise to an inverted-U in employment. 
Consumption 
First, consider a consumer’s demand for cloth. Suppose that the consumer places 
different values on different uses of cloth. The consumer’s first set of clothing might be very 
valuable and the consumer might be willing to purchase even if the price were quite high. 
But cloth draperies might be a luxury that the consumer would not be willing to purchase 
unless the price were modest. Following Dupuit (1844) and the derivation of consumer 
surplus used in industrial organization theory, these different values can be represented by a 
distribution function. Suppose that the consumer has a number of uses for cloth that each 
give her value v, no more, no less. The total yards of cloth that these uses require can be 
represented as f(v). That is, when the uses are ordered by increasing value, f(v) is a scaled 
density function giving the yards of cloth for value v. If we suppose that our consumer with 
a given wage, w, will purchase cloth for all uses where the value received exceeds the price of 
cloth, 𝑣 > 𝑝, then for price p, her individual demand is 
𝐷(𝑝;𝑤) = * 𝑓(𝑧;𝑤)𝑑𝑧./ = 1 − 𝐹(𝑝; 𝑤),								𝐹(𝑝; 𝑤) ≡ * 𝑓(𝑧;𝑤)𝑑𝑧/6  
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where I have normalized demand so that maximum demand is 1. With this normalization, f 
is the density function and F is the cumulative distribution function. I assume that these 
functions are continuous with continuous derivatives for p>0. 
The total value she receives from these purchases is then the sum of the values of all 
uses purchased, 
𝑈(𝑝; 𝑤) = * 𝑧 ∙ 𝑓(𝑧; 𝑤)𝑑𝑧./ . 
This quantity measures the gross consumer surplus and can be related to the standard 
measure of net consumer surplus used in industrial organization theory (Tirole 1988, p. 8) 
after integrating by parts: 
𝑈(𝑝;𝑤) = * 𝑧 ∙ 𝑓(𝑧;𝑤)𝑑𝑧./ = * 𝑧 ∙ 𝐷′(𝑧;𝑤)𝑑𝑧./ = 𝑝 ∙ 𝐷(𝑝;𝑤) +* 𝐷(𝑧; 𝑤)𝑑𝑧../  
In words, gross consumer surplus equals the consumer’s expenditure plus net consumer 
surplus. I interpret U as the utility that the consumer derives from cloth.8 
The consumer also derives utility from consumption of the general good, x. Assume 
that the utility from this good is additively separable from the utility of cloth so that total 
utility is 𝑈(𝑣) + 𝐺(𝑥) 
where G is a concave differentiable function. The consumer will select v and x to maximize 
total utility subject to the budget constraint 
                                               
8 Note that in order to use this model of preferences to analyze demand over time, one of two assumptions 
must hold. Either there are no significant close substitutes for cloth or the prices of these close substitutes 
change relatively little. Otherwise, consumers would have to take the changing price of the potential substitute 
into account before deciding which to purchase. If there is a close substitute with a relatively static price, the 
value v can be reinterpreted as the value relative to the alternative. Below I look specifically at the role of close 
substitutes for cotton cloth, steel, and motor vehicles. 
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(1) 𝑤 ≥ 𝑥 + 𝑝𝐷(𝑣) 
where the price of the general good is taken as numeraire and w is the consumer’s wage (all 
consumers are workers). The consumer’s Lagrangean can be written 
(2) ℒ(𝑣, 𝑥) = 𝑈(𝑣) + 𝐺(𝑥) + 	𝜆A𝑤 − 𝑥 − 𝑝 ∙ 𝐷(𝑣)B. 
Taking the first order conditions,  
(3) 𝐺C = 𝜆,					𝑣D(𝑝,𝑤) = 𝑝	𝜆 = 𝑝 ∙ 𝐺C(𝑥D(𝑝,𝑤)) 
where the subscript designates a derivative. 
Production 
Let there be three sectors, one producing cloth, one producing good x, and one 
producing an investment good, quantity I. Each sector is composed of many firms in 
competitive markets. The aggregate output of cloth, 𝑌 = 𝑌(𝐿, 𝐾, 𝑡), where L is textile labor, 
K is capital, t captures technical change, and 𝑌(∙) is a constant returns production function 
that is continuous and differentiable.9 Capital and the general good, x, are produced using 
simpler production functions 𝑋 = 𝑎 ∙ 𝐿C,					𝐼 = 𝑎 ∙ 𝐿L,					𝑁 = 𝐿 + 𝐿C + 𝐿L 
where X is the aggregate output of x, N is population (or workforce), 𝐿C and 𝐿L are the 
workforce size in the x and I production sectors, and a is a measure of general productivity 
that increases over time. Taking the price of good x and the investment good as numeraire, 
aggregate profits of each sector are 
                                               
9 Note that this production function is quite general and can accommodate labor-replacing technical change as 
in Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) and Hemous and Olsen (2016). 
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(4) 𝜋O = 𝑝 ∙ 𝑌 − 𝑤 ∙ 𝐿 − 𝑟 ∙ 𝐾,					𝜋C = 𝑋 − 𝑤 ∙ 𝐿C,					𝜋L = 𝐼 − 𝑤 ∙ 𝐿L. 
Firms in each sector employ a fraction of the aggregate labor and capital for that sector and 
earn the same fraction of profits. The first order profit maximizing conditions imply 
(5) 𝑤 = 𝑎 = 𝑝 ∙ 𝑌Q. 
Assuming that competitive markets generate zero profits in each sector and equating 
aggregate income (𝑤𝑁 + 𝑟𝐾) with aggregate output (𝑝𝑌 + 𝑋 + 𝐼), it is straightforward to 
show that consumption expenditures per capita equal w, as in the individual budget 
constraint, (1). 
Finally, since I am concerned here just with the determinants of the demand for 
cloth, I do not specify the savings function and the dynamic growth path of capital. 
Equations (3) and (5) will hold at each point in time. Also, I assume that textile consumption 
(or steel or autos) is very small compared to total consumption, 𝑝𝑌 ≪ 𝑋. The consumption 
of cotton textiles, steel, and motor vehicles never exceeded a few percent of income during 
the entire period studied. Note that this implies that SCDS/ ≈ 0 and 𝑋 ≈ 𝑤𝑁 so that each 
individual’s consumption of x is 𝑥D ≈ 𝑤 . 
Inverted-U in Employment 
Technology and employment 
It is useful to define labor productivity in cloth production, A, and labor share of 
output, s, 
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(6) 
𝐴 ≡ 𝑌𝐿 ,								𝑠 ≡ 𝑤𝐿𝑝𝑌 = 𝑤𝑝𝐴. 
For the moment, I assume that all individuals have the same demand function, D. 
Rearranging, substituting from (5) and equating total demand and output of cloth  
(𝑌 = 𝑁 ∙ 𝐷), 
(7) 
𝑝 = 𝑎𝑠𝐴,						𝐿X = 𝑁 ∙ 𝐷(𝑣D(𝑝, 𝑤))𝐴 . 
Since a represents labor productivity in the production of x, the price of cloth (relative to the 
numeraire price of x) captures the relative productivity in these two sectors. Using (7), we 
can express the impact of each type of productivity growth on textile employment. Holding 
w and s constant, 
(8) 𝜕 ln 𝐿X𝜕 ln𝐴 = 𝜕 ln𝐷𝜕 ln 𝑝 𝜕 ln 𝑝𝜕 ln𝐴 − 1 = −𝜕 ln𝐷𝜕 ln𝑝 − 1 = 	𝜖 − 1 
where 𝜖 is the price elasticity of demand for cloth. Holding A constant, and recalling (5), 
(9) 𝜕 ln𝐿X𝜕 ln 𝑎 = 𝜕 ln𝐷𝜕 ln𝑤 = 𝜇, 
where 𝜇 is the wage elasticity of demand.  
If the demand for cloth is elastic (𝜖 > 1), growing labor productivity, A, will 
increase employment; if demand is inelastic (𝜖 < 1), jobs will be lost as labor productivity 
grows. Changes in the labor productivity of x, a, capture the general growth in income. 
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Growth in a will raise employment in cloth production for positive income elasticity of 
demand. 
Price elasticity of demand  
Equation (8) makes clear that the price elasticity of demand can create an inverted-U 
in employment. Specifically, if the price elasticity of demand, 𝜖, is greater than 1 at high 
prices and lower than 1 at low prices, then employment will trace an inverted U as prices 
decline with productivity growth. 
I will now show that this pattern can occur under some fairly general conditions. 
Because cloth represents only a small fraction of the consumer’s budget, I assume that  
SCDS/ = 0. Given this assumption, the price elasticity of demand is 
(10) 
𝜖(𝑝,𝑤) = −𝜕 ln𝐷𝜕 ln 𝑝 = 𝜕 ln𝐷(𝑣D)𝜕 ln 𝑣D 𝜕 ln 𝑣D𝜕 ln 𝑝 = 𝑝𝑓(𝑣D(𝑝, 𝑤))1 − 𝐹(𝑣D(𝑝,𝑤)) 𝐺CA𝑥D(𝑤)B. 
Holding the wage constant, the price elasticity will change with the price depending 
on the nature of the preference function, 𝐹(∙). For common distribution functions, the price 
elasticity of demand will be greater than 1 at sufficiently high prices and less than 1 at 
sufficiently low prices (see Appendix for proofs): 
Proposition. Holding the wage constant and assuming SCDS/ = 0, 
1. Single-peaked density functions. If the distribution density function, f, has a single 
peak at 𝑝 = ?̅?, then S`S/ ≥ 0		∀	𝑝 < ?̅?. 
2. Common distributions. If the preference distribution is normal, lognormal, 
exponential, or uniform, there exists a 𝑝∗such that for 0 < 𝑝 < 𝑝∗, 𝜖 < 1, and for 𝑝∗ < 𝑝, 𝜖 > 1.  
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These propositions suggest that the model of demand derived from distributions of 
preferences can account for the inverted U curve in employment under fairly general 
circumstances as long as price starts above 𝑝∗ and declines below it. 
While changes in the price elasticity of demand drive the inverted-U shape in this 
model, the income elasticity of demand also changes and the level of demand is influenced 
by both changes in productivity and income more generally. In the empirical section of the 
paper, I use a nonparametric analysis to show that both factors are important in determining 
per capita demand and then I use parametric estimates to explore how well the model fits 
the time series data. 
Data 
Time series over a century in length often require combining data from different 
sources involving various adjustments. I describe the data sources and adjustments in detail 
in the Appendix. This section describes the main data series used in estimating employment 
in cotton textiles, steel, and automotive industries and in the computer technology analysis. 
Production and demand 
I use physical quantities to measure production and demand. For the textile industry, 
I measure output as yards of cotton cloth produced plus yards of cloth made of synthetic 
fibers from 1930 on. From 1958, I use the deflated output of the cotton and synthetic fiber 
broadwoven cloth industries (SIC 2211 and 2221). For the early years, I also included 
estimates of cotton cloth produced in households. For steel, I used the raw short tons of 
steel produced. For the motor vehicle industry I used the number of passenger vehicles and 
trucks produced each year. 
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To estimate per capita demand or consumption, I add net imports to the estimates 
of domestic production and divide by the population. 
Note that these measures do not adjust for product quality.10 This approach avoids 
distortions that might arise from constructing quality adjusted price indices over long periods 
of time. It does mean that “true” demand and productivity are understated. However, this 
does not pose a significant problem for my analysis because I measure both without quality 
adjustments. The distribution function I estimate would, of course, be different if it were 
estimated with quality-adjusted data, but using unadjusted data allows for consistent 
predictions of employment. 
Employment, prices, and wages 
I count the number of industry wage earners or, from 1958 on, the number of 
production workers. For prices, I use the prices of standard commodities. For cotton 
textiles, I use the wholesale price for cotton sheeting. For steel, I use wholesale prices for 
steel rails. I do not have a similar commodity price for motor vehicles. The BLS does have a 
price index for the automotive industry, but this measure implicitly changes as the quality of 
vehicles improved. I need to use a commodity type price because my measures of output and 
consumption (cars and trucks) does not capture these quality improvements. For wages, I 
use the compensation of manufacturing production workers. This measure includes the 
value of employee benefits from 1906 on. 
Because price data are limited, I also obtain data on labor’s share of output, the wage 
bill divided by the value of product shipped. Prices relative to wages can then be estimated 
from labor share and labor productivity series because from (6), 𝑝 𝑤 = 𝑠 ∙ 𝐴⁄ . 
                                               
10 The deflators used from 1958 on in cotton are quality adjusted but the series closely matches the unadjusted 
output measure during the years when they overlap. 
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Labor productivity 
I calculate labor productivity by dividing output by the number of production 
employees times the number of hours worked per year. I use industry specific estimates of 
hours if available and estimates of hours for manufacturing workers if not.  
Over the sample periods, each industry exhibited rapid labor productivity growth. 
From 1820 to 1995, labor productivity in cotton textiles grew 2.9% per year; in steel, it grew 
2.4% per year from 1860 to 1982; in motor vehicles, it grew 1.4% per year from 1910 
through 2007. Figure 2 shows labor productivity for each industry on a log scale over time. 
Each industry exhibits steady productivity growth over long periods of time. Textiles and 
especially automotive show initially higher rates of growth; steel exhibits faster growth since 
the 1970s, likely the effect of steel minimills that use recycled steel rather than blast furnace 
production of iron. 
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Figure 2. Labor Productivity over Time 
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Empirical Findings 
Are productivity and income both important for structural change? 
As noted above, the literature on sectoral change largely divides into papers that see 
deindustrialization arising from the relative productivity of the manufacturing sector and 
other papers that see rising incomes as the driver instead. My model (and Boppart 2014) sees 
both factors as important in explaining the rise and fall of employment in specific industries, 
especially because productivity growth has been an order of magnitude larger than income 
growth. 
Table 1 explores the relative explanatory power of both factors non-parametrically, 
specifically with quadratic forms similar to this: ln𝐷 = 𝛼 + 𝛽f ln𝑤 + 𝛽g(ln𝑤)g + 𝛾f ln𝐴 + 𝛾g(ln𝐴)g + 𝜀. 
I perform this regression using two different measures of income and labor productivity. F 
tests on the null hypotheses that 𝛽f = 𝛽g = 0 and 𝛾f = 𝛾g = 0 provide one measure of 
explanatory significance. The left hand panel uses real GDP per capita as the income 
measure; the right panel uses the real production wage (deflated by the CPI). 
The F tests strongly reject the null hypothesis of no effect for the productivity 
measures in all cases. By contrast, the null hypothesis is rejected for income only in the 
motor vehicle industry; it cannot be rejected in cotton and steel. The implication is that 
models based on income alone cannot sufficiently account for the changes in per capita 
demand over time in all markets; models need to incorporate both income and productivity, 
but especially productivity. 
I also show the variance of each quadratic form using the estimated coefficients 
divided by the variance of the dependent variable. This provides a crude measure of the 
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variance “explained” by each factor, ignoring covariances. These ratios also show that 
variations in income can only account for a relatively small portion of the total variation in 
consumption per capita. 
Parametric estimates 
Applying the model 
The model above provides a parsimonious explanation for the inverted U shape of 
industry employment observed over time. But how well does this highly simplified model 
actually predict the patterns observed? A close fit would provide some support for its 
relevance. However, the model abstracts away from several considerations that might 
undermine efforts to fit the model, considerations that I discuss in this section. In general, I 
find that the model fits the data for employment and consumption rather well despite these 
concerns, except during the most recent decades of the textile and steel industries. 
One concern is that the model assumes no substantial interference from close 
substitute products. That means that either there are no substitutes or that the productivity 
growth in substitutes is sufficiently slow that the effect of substitution can be taken as 
constant. Each industry did have substitutes, especially during the early years. However, it 
seems that these substitutes were fairly static technologically and were quickly overtaken. 
Cotton cloth competed with wool and linen. However, wool and linen were mainly 
produced within the household (Zevin 1971) and did not directly compete in most markets. 
In urban markets where they did compete, wool tended to be substantially more expensive 
per pound and its price declined only slowly compared to cotton.11 During the early years of 
the Bessemer steel process, steel rails were much more expensive than iron rails, but steel 
                                               
11 For example, in Philadelphia in 1820, wool was $0.75 per pound while cotton sheeting was $0.15 (US Bureau 
of the Census 1975). 
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rails lasted much longer, making the higher price worth it for many uses. By 1883, the price 
of steel rails fell below the price of iron rails, eliminating the production of this substitute 
(Temin 1964 p. 222). And cars and trucks competed with horse drawn vehicles during the 
early years. However, here, too, production of horse drawn vehicles collapsed very quickly.12  
It is also possible that new technologies introduce new substitutes or find new uses 
for commodities, changing the shape of the preference distribution function. Since the 
1970s, steel may have faced greater competition from aluminum and other materials for use 
in cars and cans (Tarr 1988 p. 177-8), perhaps contributing to the poorer fit of the model 
then (see below).  
Another concern is that the distribution of preferences changes over time, for 
instance, as income inequality changes. Also, product quality changes over time, distorting 
consumption measures that are not adjusted for quality. In addition, the model does not take 
into account time patterns of consumption for consumer durables (auto) and investment 
goods (some steel). In any case, despite all these potential problems, the model fits the data 
reasonably well. 
Parameterizing the model 
In order to investigate the model empirically, it is helpful to provide a flexible 
functional form for 𝐺C : 
(11) 𝐺CA𝑥D(𝑝,𝑤)B = 𝑥Djkf,				0 ≤ 𝛼 < 1. 13 
Recalling that the partial equilibrium assumption implies that 𝑥D ≈ 𝑤, (3) and (6) yield 
                                               
12 The production of carriages, buggies, and sulkies fell from 538 thousand in 1914 to 34 thousand in 1921; the 
production of farm wagons, horse-drawn trucks, and business vehicles fell from 534 thousand in 1914 to 67 
thousand in 1921 (US Bureau of the Census 1975). 
13 Making 𝐺(𝑥) = 𝑥j  if 𝛼 > 0 or 𝐺(𝑥) = ln 𝑥 if 𝛼 = 0. 
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(12) 𝑣D(𝑝, 𝑤) ≈ 𝑝𝑤 ∙ 𝑤j = 𝑠 ∙ 𝐴 ∙ 𝑤j. 
The first expression presents 𝑣D as the product of the ratio of price to the wage—as is 
commonly specified in indirect utility functions—and a pure income term. The second 
expression presents 𝑣D as the product of labor productivity in textiles and an income term 
(the labor share of output is approximately constant during most of the sample period).  
Then, choosing a lognormal specification for 𝐹(∙),	per capita demand, D, can be 
written 
(13) 
𝐷 = 𝛾 n1 − Φp−ln 𝑠𝐴 + 𝛼 ln𝑤 − 𝜇𝜎 rs + 𝜀 
or 
 
(14) 
𝐷 = 𝛾 n1 − Φtln 𝑝 𝑤⁄ + 𝛼 ln𝑤 − 𝜇𝜎 us + 𝜀 
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and 𝜀 is an error term that 
captures, among other things, demand shocks and changing tastes. 𝛾, 𝜇 and 𝜎 are parameters 
to be estimated. Finally, the per capita demand function is defined above as the demand of a 
single individual above. It is straightforward to re-conceptualize D as an average over all 
individual consumers.  
Demand Curves 
Before seeking to estimate the model, it is helpful to examine the demand curves 
graphically. Figure 3 shows per capita demand (consumption) for each good against labor 
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productivity times labor share of output, both on logarithmic scales. The solid line is simply 
a log version of equation (13) fit to the data (with 𝛼 = 0 as discussed below).  
Figure 3. Per Capita Consumption 
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In Figure 3A and 3B, the circles represent observations where the measure of 
demand fails to capture the effect of imports of downstream products. Demand needs to 
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take trade into consideration and so I have calculated demand by adding net imports to the 
amount of product produced domestically. However, for textiles and steel, further 
adjustment is needed because these are intermediate goods industries. The ultimate 
consumption good is produced by another industry and that good can be imported as well. 
For example, the consumption of textiles in the form of apparel includes: 1) apparel 
produced in the US with US cloth, 2) textiles that were imported to the US and used by  
domestic apparel producers, and 3) apparel produced outside the US using cloth also 
produced outside the US. Even after adjusting for imports of textiles, my measure of 
consumption misses the cloth imported in apparel made abroad. 
For this reason, I can only estimate demand for those years where downstream 
imports are not too large. For textiles, I estimate demand through 1995; in 1996, imports 
comprised a third of apparel imports for the first time and have grown rapidly since. For 
steel, I estimate demand through 1982. After that, the largest steel-using industries, 
fabricated metal products and machinery excluding computers (SIC 34 and 35 excluding 
357), show a large increase in import penetration. Between 1982 and 1987, the import 
penetration (net imports over domestic production) grew 10.5%. As the Figure shows, per 
capita consumption falls dramatically around these cutoff years. Because the consumption 
data become unrepresentative after these years, I estimate the model only for prior years. As 
a robustness check, I used different cutoff years, but small changes in the cutoff year did not 
change coefficient estimates significantly.  
Model estimates 
Table 2 shows NLLS estimates of equations (13) in columns 1 and 2 and estimates 
of equation (14) for textile and steel in column 3. Columns 1 and 3 set 𝛼 = 0, excluding 
secondary income effects. All of the regressions have a good fit, although the regressions 
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using labor productivity (columns 1 and 2) fit better than those using the ratio of prices to 
wages (column 3), probably because of the greater volatility of wholesale price data. Note 
that the model fits the data better than estimates using a simple quadratic form in Table 1. 
None of the estimates in column 2 find a significant coefficient for 𝛼 and the NLLS 
regression for the auto industry failed to converge for this specification. The lack of a 
significant estimate of 𝛼 may be because of lack of statistical power, but it suggests that per 
capita demand is close to a simple function of 𝑝 𝑤v .  This specification corresponds to a 
common assumption in the literature that indirect utility is a function of price over wage.  
Recalling that w/ = 𝑠𝐴, assuming that 𝛼 = 0 makes for a simple interpretation of 
Figure 3. First, it is straightforward to show that with this assumption, the price elasticity of 
demand equals the income elasticity of demand. Since the x-axes represent ln 𝑠𝐴 = lnw/  and 
the vertical axes represent ln𝐷, the slope of the curve in each panel represents the elasticity 
of demand (price and income). The shape of these curves neatly shows the decline in 
elasticity accompanying the growth of productivity. 
These predicted levels of per capita demand can also be used to estimate industry 
production employment by dividing domestic demand (total demand divided by 1 + import 
penetration) by the annual output per production worker. Measuring labor productivity as 
output per production worker-hour this is14 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1 + 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡	𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∙ 1𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟	𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦	 ∙ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠	𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑑/𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟. 
These estimates are shown as the solid lines in Figure 1. The estimates appear to be 
accurate over long periods of time. There are notable drops in employment during the Great 
                                               
14 For 1820 and before, I also subtract the estimate of labor performed in households. 
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Depression and excess employment in motor vehicles during World War II. Finally, 
employment drops sharply for the years when my measure of consumption fails in textiles 
(after 1995) and steel (after 1982). It appears that this simple model using a lognormal 
distribution of preferences provides a succinct explanation of the inverted U in employment 
in these industries. 
Implications 
The Industrial Revolution 
Robert Zevin (1971) describes the “remarkable explosion” of economic activity at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century that was dominated by the cotton textile industry: 
The first great expansion of modern industrial activity in the United States took place 
in New England from the end of the War of 1812 to the middle of the 1830s. By the 
census of 1840 factories had become familiar landmarks at hundreds of New 
England waterpower sites; large cities such as Lowell and Holyoke had been created 
entirely by the advance of industrial activity, while Fall River, Pawtucket, Worcester, 
and the like had been greatly enlarged and transformed by the same advance. About 
100,000 people were employed by large-scale manufacturing enterprises, with 20 or 
30 employing up to 1500 employees each (pp. 122-3). 
 
In Zevin’s interpretation, this change was mostly driven by rapid demand growth, 
reaching peak rates of 8 or 9 percent per year. He cites the growing population of the West 
as the principle cause, with growing incomes, urbanization, the high price of substitutes, and 
lower transportation costs also contributing. Zevin additionally notes that the price elasticity 
of demand declined, although he does not offer an explanation as to why this happened.  
My estimates do not contradict Zevin’s analysis—he guesses that the price elasticity 
of demand began at around 2.5, similar to my estimate. But my analysis puts the growth rate 
of employment into a longer-term context. The growth of the West was surely important, 
especially before 1820 when it was particularly rapid. Yet the initial high elasticity of demand 
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and its subsequent decline generate a rising and then ebbing tide of labor growth in an 
industry where labor productivity has persistently grown at 3 percent per year. 
My analysis suggests that this pattern—high initial demand elasticity that declines 
over time—might be more general, contributing to high initial employment growth in the 
steel and auto industries as well as, perhaps, in other leading industries. That is, the 
“remarkable explosion” in industrial activity in textiles and in other leading industries may 
have derived from a potent combination of high productivity growth and highly elastic 
demand. And the decline in demand elasticity reconciles the high employment growth of the 
past with the current job losses in many manufacturing industries. Of course, not all 
industries exhibited these characteristics; the “leading industries” were precisely those 
industries characterized by rapid growth.  
It has long been recognized that industrial development was uneven, that new 
technology altered some industries but not others. The analysis here suggests that differences 
in demand might also have been important in shaping the pattern of development. For 
example, the high elasticity of demand for some manufacturing industries might help explain 
the transition from workshop to factory even in non-mechanized industries. Sokoloff (1984) 
presents evidence of such a transformation from 1820 to 1850, arguing that even without 
mechanization, many factories achieved productivity gains through a finer division of labor. 
It seems likely that these establishments realized productivity gains, but gains of a smaller 
magnitude than some of the mechanized factories. Yet many of these firms may have been 
in industries with high demand elasticity so that they experienced significant growth in 
demand even though their productivity gains might have been relatively modest. 
The early elasticity of demand also helps explain why technological change during 
the early nineteenth century has been described as an Industrial Revolution. Abramovitz and 
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David (2001) estimated that overall output per manhour in the US grew at only 0.39 percent 
per year from 1800 through 1855. Yet this slow rate of growth was accompanied by leading 
industries where demand was growing 8 or 9 percent annually. Society was transformed 
despite the slow overall rate of growth. 
In general, because new technologies were addressing markets with large unmet 
needs—the upper tail of the consumer preference distribution—the price and income 
elasticities of demand were high and this tended to accelerate other processes. For example, 
the emergence of national product markets surely had much to do with the decline in 
transportation costs (much of it driven by new technology) and the growing Western 
population. But the high elasticity of demand for many manufactured products would have 
increased the payoffs to market expansion, accelerating the rise of national markets. 
Similarly, the slowing of demand growth as markets matured may have heightened market 
competition, hastening the merger and trust movement of the late nineteenth century.  
Trade vs. technology in manufacturing job losses 
The model provides an estimate of the impact of technology on industry 
employment as mediated by demand. We can use this to understand how much technology 
contributed to the loss of manufacturing jobs compared to other factors including trade. 
Using predicted industry employment without the correction for imports, actual and 
predicted employment changes can be compared: 
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Cotton & synthetic textiles Steel 
 Production workers (1000s) Production workers (1000s) 
Year Actual Predicted Tech share Actual Predicted Tech share 
1950 350 348 
 
550 511 
 2005 42 97 
 
100 120 
 Job losses 
1950 - 2005 308 251 81% 450 391 87% 
 
In both textiles and steel, most of the jobs have disappeared since 1950 and most of 
the losses can be attributed to growth in labor productivity without compensating growth in 
demand. Other factors, including trade, the recession, and, perhaps changing tastes, can 
account for only 29% of the job losses in textiles and 13% in steel.  
That said, technology does not account for much of the more recent losses especially 
in textiles. Most of the recent loss in textile manufacturing jobs appears to be the result of 
the collapse of the domestic apparel industry in the face of heavy global competition. Note 
that the effect of trade on textile and steel manufacturing jobs does not appear to be mainly 
about imports of textiles and steel—the import penetration in textiles was 8.9% in 2005 and 
in steel it was 5.2%. Instead, the main impact of trade appears to have come through its 
effect on downstream industries. 
The direction and rate of job changes 
A naïve view holds that more rapid productivity growth will be more likely to create 
job losses. The analysis in this paper suggests, to the contrary, that demand determines 
whether productivity growth eliminates or increases jobs. Moreover, if demand is elastic, 
then more rapid productivity growth will actually lead to faster employment growth, all else 
equal. While the sign of the employment effect depends on the elasticity of demand and not 
on the rate of productivity growth, the rate of change depends on both. For instance, 
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although productivity grew faster in cotton textiles than in auto (after 1914), employment 
grew faster in auto; the distribution of preferences for motor vehicles was much more 
concentrated (small 𝜎) than the distribution for textiles. 
One might expect that computer technology would have a different effect on job 
growth across industries depending on industry demand elasticity. Assuming that the 
historical process of deindustrialization means that manufacturing industries have less elastic 
(more satiated) demand than most other industries on average, then computer technology 
should have a relatively more negative impact on employment in manufacturing industries, 
all else equal.15 
Several recent papers find that information technology increases employment for 
some groups and does not appear to reduce net employment, except in manufacturing. 
Gaggl and Wright (2014) find that ICT tended to raise employment in wholesale, retail, and 
finance industries, but had no statistically significant effect on other sectors, including 
manufacturing. Akerman, Gaarder, and Mogstad (2015) find that Internet technology 
increased employment of skilled workers and had no effect on unskilled. Mann and 
Püttmann (2017) find that automation increases jobs in services but decreases them in 
manufacturing. Bessen (2016) finds that computers tend to increase occupational 
employment modestly overall, with job losses in low wage occupations. Autor, Dorn, and 
Hansen (2015) find that local markets susceptible to computerization are not more likely to 
experience employment loss. Autor and Salomons (2018) find that productivity growth is 
                                               
15 To the extent that information technology allows manufacturers to create new products, then the technology 
might tap into new sources of demand and thus be more elastic. There is some evidence that information 
technology is used to create new products (see for example Bartel, Ichniowski, and Shaw 2007). New product 
varieties might provide a reason that the association between IT and employment growth in manufacturing is 
only weakly negative. 
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associated with net increases in employment, although direct effects in some industries are 
negative. 
Conclusion 
A simple model explains the rise and subsequent fall of manufacturing employment 
in the face of ongoing productivity growth. Productivity-enhancing technology will increase 
industry employment if product demand is sufficiently elastic. Technical change reduces the 
labor required needed to produce a unit of output, but it also reduces prices in competitive 
markets. If the price elasticity of demand is greater than one, the increase in demand will 
more than offset the labor-saving effect of the technology.  
Understanding the responsiveness of demand is thus key to understanding whether 
major new technologies will decrease or increase employment in affected industries. This 
paper proposes that industry employment dynamics can be analyzed by deriving demand 
from a distribution of preferences. For many distribution functions, the elasticity of demand 
declines as price declines and productivity grows. In particular, a parsimonious model using a 
lognormal distribution fits the demand curves well for cotton textiles, steel, and motor 
vehicles over long periods of time. 
This model generates an industry life cycle explanation for the inverted U pattern of 
industrialization/deindustrialization seen in manufacturing employment. At high initial 
prices, industries have large unmet demand that is highly elastic. Productivity improvements 
give rise to robust job growth. Over time and with ongoing productivity gains, prices 
progressively decline until most demand is met and the price elasticity of demand is quite 
low. Then further productivity gains bring reduced employment. 
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This model thus reconciles the role of technological change in deindustrialization 
today with its role spurring employment growth in the past. Demand plays a major role in 
understanding the pattern of change in the Industrial Revolution and subsequent 
technological revolutions.  
This view implies that major new technologies today should increase employment if 
they improve productivity in markets that have large unmet needs. Some evidence suggests 
that this is the case with information technology and other recent forms of automation. This 
model challenges a popular view that faster technical change is more likely to eliminate jobs. 
Some people argue that because of Moore’s Law, the rate of change will be fast in new 
information technologies and this will cause unemployment (Ford 2015). However, if 
demand is elastic, faster technical change will, instead, create faster employment growth. 
Faster technical change will, however, also hasten the day when demand is no longer so 
elastic and deindustrialization sets in.  
This analysis raises a number of other questions. For one, it would be helpful to 
understand what factors shape the preference distribution functions. For instance, in the 
model, the pace of industrialization/deindustrialization is affected by the variance of the 
distribution of preferences. Nations with greater income equality might have more 
homogenous preferences and hence a narrower distribution (smaller standard deviation). A 
narrower distribution of preferences, in turn, implies more rapid employment growth during 
industrialization. In this way, income inequality might slow the pace of economic 
development. Correspondingly, income inequality might also affect the pace of 
deindustrialization as markets mature. Another area for investigation concerns trade. The 
model in this paper abstracts away from the effect of imports on demand. Clearly, imports 
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might play a role in decelerating industrial development in exposed economies, heightening 
patterns of “premature deindustrialization” (Rodrik 2017).  
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Appendix 
Propositions 
To simplify notation, let 𝐺C = 1. Then, keeping wages constant, 
𝜖(𝑝) = 𝑝	𝑓(𝑝)1 − 𝐹(𝑝) 
so that 𝜕	𝜖(𝑝)𝜕	𝑝 = 𝑓𝑝1 − 𝐹 + 𝑓g𝑝(1 − 𝐹)g + 𝑓1 − 𝐹 = 𝜖 t𝑓′𝑓 + 𝑓1 − 𝐹 + 1𝑝u	
Note that the second and third terms in parentheses are positive for 𝑝 > 0; the first term 
could be positive or negative. A sufficient condition for S`S/ ≥ 0 is 
(A1) 𝑓′𝑓 + 𝑓1 − 𝐹 ≥ 0. 
Proposition 1. For a single peaked distribution with mode ?̅?, for 𝑝 < ?̅? , 𝑓 ≥ 0 so that 
S`S/ ≥ 0	.	 
Proposition 2. For each distribution, I will show that 𝜕𝜖𝜕𝑝 ≥ 0,					 lim/→6 𝜖 = 0,				 lim/→. 𝜖 = ∞. 
Taken together, these conditions imply that for sufficiently high price, 𝜖 > 1, and for a 
sufficiently low price, 𝜖 < 1. 
a. Normal distribution  
𝑓(𝑝) = 1𝜎 𝜑(𝑥),						𝐹(𝑝) = Φ(𝑥),						𝜖(𝑝) = 𝑝𝜎 𝜑(𝑥)(1 − Φ(𝑥)) ,					𝑥 ≡ 𝑝 − 𝜇𝜎  
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where 𝜑 and Φ are the standard normal density and cumulative distribution functions 
respectively. Taking the derivative of the density function, 𝑓𝑓 + 𝑓1 − 𝐹 = −𝑥𝜎 + 𝜑(𝑥)𝜎	A1 − Φ(𝑥)B. 
A well-known inequality for the normal Mills’ ratio (Gordon 1941) holds that for x>0,16 
(A2) 
𝑥 ≤ 𝜑(𝑥)1 − Φ(𝑥). 
Applying this inequality, it is straightforward to show that (A1) holds for the normal 
distribution. This also implies that lim/→. 𝜖 = ∞. By inspection, 𝜖(0) = 0. 
b. Exponential distribution 𝑓(𝑝) ≡ 𝜆𝑒k/,						𝐹(𝑝) ≡ 1 − 𝑒k/,				𝜖(𝑝) = 𝜆𝑝,					𝜆, 𝑝 > 0. 
Then 𝑓𝑓 + 𝑓1 − 𝐹 = −𝜆 + 𝜆 = 0 
so (A1) holds. By inspection, 𝜖(0) = 0 and lim/→. 𝜖 = ∞. 
c. Uniform distribution 
𝑓(𝑝) ≡ 1𝑏 ,					𝐹(𝑝) ≡ 𝑝𝑏 ,						𝜖(𝑝) = 𝑝𝑏 − 𝑝 ,					0 < 𝑝 < 𝑏 
so that 𝑓𝑓 + 𝑓1 − 𝐹 = 1𝑏 − 𝑝 > 0. 
By inspection, 𝜖(0) = 0 and lim/→ 𝜖 = ∞. 
                                               
16 I present the inverse of Gordon’s inequality. 
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d. Lognormal distribution 
𝑓(𝑝) ≡ 1𝑝𝜎 𝜑(𝑥),						𝐹(𝑝) ≡ Φ(𝑥),							𝜖(𝑝) = 1𝜎 𝜑(𝑥)A1 − Φ(𝑥)B ,				𝑥 ≡ ln 𝑝 − 𝜇𝜎  
so that 𝜕	𝜖(𝑝)𝜕	𝑝 = 𝜖 t𝑓′𝑓 + 𝑓1 − 𝐹 + 1𝑝u = 𝜖 p−1𝑝 − 𝑥𝑝𝜎 + 𝜑𝑝𝜎(1 −Φ) + 1𝑝r. 
Cancelling terms and using Gordon’s inequality, this is positive. And taking the limit of 
Gordon’s inequality, lim/→. 𝜖 = ∞. By inspection lim/→6 𝜖 = 0. 
Historical data sources 
I obtain data on production employees for cotton and steel from Lebergott (1966, 
see also US Bureau of the Census 1975) through 1950, and from 1958 on from the NBER-
CES manufacturing database for SIC 2211 and 2221 (broadwoven fabric mills, cotton and 
manmade fibers and silk) and SIC 3312 (primary iron and steel). The former measures the 
number of wage earners while the more recent series measure production employees. I find 
that these series are reasonably close for overlapping years. For 1820 in cotton, I estimate 
5,600 full time equivalent workers producing in households, using estimates of household 
production and Davis and Stettler’s (1966) estimates of output per worker. For the auto 
industry, I use the BLS Current Employment Statistics series for motor vehicle production 
workers from 1929 on. For 1910 and 1920, I obtained the number of employees in the 
motor vehicle industry from the 1% Census samples (Ruggles et al. 2015) and prorated those 
figures by the ratio of BLS production workers to Census industry employees for 1930. 
Weekly hours data for motor vehicles also come from the BLS from 1929 on. For 
earlier years and for cotton and steel before 1958, I use Whaples (2001) before 1939, linearly 
interpolating for missing year observations. From 1939 to 1958 I use the BLS Current 
Employment Statistics series for manufacturing production and nonsupervisory personnel. 
In cotton and steel, I use the NBER-CES data for production hours from 1958 on (this 
comes from the BLS industry data). 
For cotton production, I begin with Davis and Stettler’s (1966, Table 9) estimates of 
yards produced per man-year for 1820 and 1831 multiplied by the estimate of the number of 
cotton textile wage earners for those years (I assume productivity was the same in 1830 and 
1831). For 1820, I estimate that an additional 9.6 million yards were produced in households 
based on data from Tryon (1917). From 1830 on, Tryon’s estimates indicate little cotton 
cloth was produced at home. From 1840 through 1950, I use estimates of the pounds of 
cotton consumed in textile production times three yards per pound (US Bureau of the 
Census 1975 and Statistical Abstracts, various years). This ratio is the historically used rule of 
thumb, but I also found that it applies reasonably well to a variety of twentieth century test 
statistics. While some cotton is lost in the production process (5% or less typically), these 
losses changed little over time. From 1930 on, I also include the weight of manmade fibers 
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consumed in textile production. From 1958 on I found that the deflated output of SIC 2211 
and 2221 in the NBER-CES tracked the pounds of fiber consumed closely for the ten years 
when I had measures of both. I used the average ratio for these years to estimate yards of 
cloth produced based on the NBER-CES real output from 1958 on. For steel, my output 
measure is the short tons of raw steel produced (Carter 2006). From 1913 through 1950, I 
measure motor vehicle production using the NBER Macrohistory Database series on 
passenger car and truck production. I obtained a figure for 1910 production from 
Wikipedia.17 From 1951 on, I use car and truck production figures from the Ward’s 
Automotive Yearbook, prorated to match the NBER series. 
For consumption of motor vehicles, I use the Ward’s Automotive series on sales of 
passenger cars and trucks. For cotton and steel, I add net imports to domestic production. 
For cotton from 1820 through 1950, I use the net dollar imports of cotton manufactures 
divided by the price of cloth. From 1820 through 1860, I use Sandberg’s (1971) estimate of 
the price of British imports; from 1860 through 1950, I use the price of cotton sheeting (see 
below). From 1958 on, I use import penetration ratios from Feenstra (1958 though 1994) 
and Schott (1995 on). For steel, I use Temin’s (1964, p. 282) estimates for steel rail imports 
from 1860 through 1889. I use the Feenstra and Schott import penetration estimates from 
1958 on; I ignore steel imports between 1890 and 1957. 
For prices, I use the series on cotton sheeting from 1820 through 1974 (Carter 2006, 
Cc205); for steel I use series for the price of steel rails, splicing together separate series for 
Bessemer, open hearth, standard, and carbon steel (Carter 2006, CC244-7). 
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Tables 
Table 1. Nonparametric tests of income and productivity   
Dependent variable: log consumption / capita 
 
 Income = GDP / capita Income = production wage 
Quadratics in: 
Degrees 
freedom F 
Prob. 
value 
Share 
variance 
Degrees 
freedom F 
Prob. 
value 
Share 
variance 
Cotton 
        Income 47 3.00 0.060 16% 47 0.20 0.818 1% 
Productivity 47 150.16 0.000** 64% 47 23.27 0.000** 117% 
R-squared 0.981 
   
0.980 
   Steel 
        Income 30 0.72 0.497 3% 30 1.40 0.262 3% 
Productivity 30 12.19 0.000** 70% 30 50.38 0.000** 120% 
R-squared 0.977 
   
0.977 
   Autos 
        Income 56 10.00 0.000** 15% 56 7.42 0.001** 14% 
Productivity 56 185.00 0.000** 46% 56 25.82 0.000** 55% 
R-squared 0.933 
   
0.916 
   Note: Each regression on ln consumption per capita includes two quadratic forms, one on the log of an income 
variable and one on the log of labor productivity. The reported F statistics are for tests of the null hypothesis 
that all of the quadratic coefficients are zero. The tests have 5 constraints and the residual degrees of freedom 
listed. **= significant at 1%; * = significant at 5%. The share of variance is the variance of the quadratic form 
over the variance of the dependent variable. 
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Table 2. Regressions of Per Capita Demand 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 Independent 
variable Labor productivity Labor productivity Price / wage 
 
A. Cotton cloth, 1820 - 1995 𝜇 -0.24 (0.10)** 0.40 (1.36) -1.49 (.79)* 𝜎 1.43 (0.15)*** 1.64 (0.29)*** 2.04 (.58)** 𝛾 134.60 (3.80)*** 135.17 (3.66)*** 184.42 (49.15)** 𝛼 
  
-0.16 (0.32) 
  Observations 52 
 
52 
 
37 
 R-squared 0.993 
 
0.993 
 
0.990 
  
B. Raw steel, 1860 – 1982 𝜇 5.04 (0.18)*** 4.85 (3.38) 3.60 (.86)*** 𝜎 0.83 (0.18)*** 0.79 (0.50) 1.46 (.40)*** 𝛾 0.66 (0.05)*** 0.66 (0.07)*** 1.32 (.64)** 𝛼 
  
0.05 (0.90) 
  Observations 35 
 
35 
 
116 
 R-squared 0.981 
 
0.981 
 
0.958 
  
C. Motor vehicles, 1910 – 2007 𝜇 7.31 (0.04)*** 
  𝜎 0.30 (0.06)*** 
  𝛾 59.40 (2.78)*** 
  Observations 61 
   R-squared 0.977 
   Note: Non-linear least squares estimates of equation (4) in columns 1 and 2 and equation (5) in column 3. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***= significant at 1%; ** = significant at 5%; * = significant at 10%. 
 
 
